Chapter 9

The Outer Defenses: Building and Perimeter Protection

Goal: To understand and discuss building and perimeter protection.

Objectives: 

• Explain the purpose of barriers, fences, and walls as they relate to building and perimeter protection.
• Explain how to secure gates and other openings in barriers, fences, and walls.
• Describe how to set up barrier protection.
• Explain how to deal with parking and surveillance in unroofed or outside areas within the perimeter.
• Identify and explain the advantages and disadvantages of various types of lighting.
• Describe the planning involved in perimeter security.

Lecture:

This chapter begins from the outermost defenses and works inward. Chapter Ten completes the coverage of working inward to object protection. There are four lines of protection about which you should be aware. Be concerned more with these than with the technicalities and types of lighting and forms of illumination. 

Barriers can be natural or structural, with the most common type of fence (a structural barrier) being the chain link type, preferably constructed in a straight line. There should be a clear zone on either side of your fence, and all gates should be locked when not in use. Be especially concerned with old insecure structures inside the perimeter, particularly one next to a secure structure.

Let's now look at some of this stuff in more detail, OK?

The perimeter of the facility property is the first line of defense.  It may be the outer wall of a building but in a big plant, it is often the boundary line.  Maybe there is a fence or just some signs that say "private property - trespassers will be violated!"  The perimeter protection may be natural or man-made.  Natural barriers include cliffs, ravines, creeks or rivers; maybe even a very prickly hedge.  Man-made barriers include fences, walls, grills, doors, gates, roadblocks, etc.  All barriers, natural and man-made, can be overcome, some more easily than others.  So why have them?  Remember we talked earlier about security functions of deter, detect, delay, assess and respond?  Well, barriers deter some threats and delay others. 

Beginning on page 149 of your text, there is a discussion on fences.  The most popular security fencing is chain link.  The Department of Defense standard fence is 6 or 7 feet high with what is called a top guard.  This is an outrigger deal at the top, facing out, and it usually has three or four strands of barbed wire attached to it.  This effectively adds another foot to the height of the fence.  Looks pretty formidable but it can be overcome, trust me.  Other fences may be wrought iron or even cattle-type fencing.  A really mean looking fence is the barbed tape concertina fence (page 151).  Because it is ugly and does not invite customers to your business, it is not usually used in business.  (It is more a military fence in the field. I  crawled through a few when I was a little boy in the Army.)

There are variations on fences.  Go to http://www.amico-securityproducts.com for an example.

Another barrier is a wall.  Walls can be brick, masonry, block.  Walls along the perimeter might look nicer than a fence but, while the bad guy can't look in, the security people inside can't look out--something to consider.

Here's something to remember about barriers, especially fences: you need to maintain what are called clear zones.  These are lanes along the inside and outside of the barrier that have been mowed, cleared of brush, trees, etc.  Why?  One reason is to allow patrols to have unobstructed views along the barrier to be able to detect potential intruders trying to hide in tall grass, etc.  Another reason is to allow patrols and maintenance people to see the condition of the barrier.  And, in some places, there may be sensors in that area or very well-maintained sand strips that show foot prints.

What about electrified fences?  Lethal electric fences are rare.  I have been to one place that had one - that was in the early 80's and I don't think they have it anymore.   It was a holdover from the old Manhattan Project - do you know what that was about?  If you do, you can understand why this place had an electrified fence. In our society, we generally frown on what is called "automated deadly force."  That is, deadly force that does not require pulling of a trigger or some other positive action by a security officer. 

Some places have double or triple barriers, e.g., most nuke sites.  In that case there is a barrier along the outer facility perimeter.  That surrounds what is called a "controlled area."  There are usually offices, warehouses, and maybe housing inside that fence.  Then deep inside the perimeter will be another smaller area, also surrounded by a fence. This marks the "limited area."  Inside that is another fence, and it marks the "exclusion area."  Within each area, going from controlled the exclusion, the security gets tighter.  There is usually a vehicle and pedestrian gate set-up at the limited and exclusion areas called a "sally port."  As you drive up to the gate on the limited area perimeter, you show your badge.  The outer gate is opened and you drive in.  In front of you is the gate in the exclusion area fence.  It remains closed and the limited area gate closes behind you.  While you're boxed in there, the officer checks you vehicle, your briefcase, etc., and you probably exchange your normal badge for the exclusion area badge (very few employees on the facility have these badges).  If everything is in order, the exclusion area gate opens, you drive in and then that gate closes behind you.  The process is reversed on the way out.  Usually only one vehicle or person is allowed in the sally port at a given time.

With fences and walls, you need openings for people to get in and out.  These are always vulnerable places and need additional security measures.  For example, when they are closed and locked, you should have patrols or other means of checking them.  If a patrol is checking, it needs to really look at the securing devices. I remember a place I had in northern Spain.  We'd lock up the gate at night with a heavy chain and a good padlock.  Well, every night a patrol would drive by but not check by pulling and inspecting the chain and lock.  One day as we were opening up, we noted that someone had cut the chain and then put it back together with a plastic electric wire-tie.  If we or the patrol had been looking carefully at the chain, we'd have seen it.  I still have no idea when this happened or who did it.  But after that we sure paid more attention to chains and locks on patrol checks.

Back to gates: they can be swinging, sliding, lifting, or even railroad crossing arm types.  Some may be automated and operate when you punch in a code or maybe slide a card through or near a reader.  Others may be controlled by an officer.  If they operate automatically, there needs to be a method by which they close automatically.  Most vehicle gates that are automated have sensors under ground that detect when the vehicle clears the gate.  Gates need to be designed to be wide enough to accommodate people (pedestrian gates) or vehicles (vehicle gates).  But they shouldn't be wide enough for more than one person (or vehicle) to get through at a time unless you have means of controlling entry and exit.  Sometimes, instead of a gate or door, you may see turnstiles.  We use them very effectively where I work.  They are controlled by badge readers and allow only one person through at a time.  There is an anti-pass back (sometimes called anti-piggy back) feature that prevents me from going in and passing my badge back to you so you can come in on my badge.  The system also keeps a very accurate audit trail.

Almost all barriers have other types of openings that need to be addressed:

Culverts

Utility tunnels

Sewer openings (don't forget to check on manholes outside your facility! Do they allow entry under ground? During the Olympics some of the manhole covers in SLC were welded shut.)

Also, make sure that trees and power and light poles don't allow easy passage over your barrier.  In other words, make sure they are not near your barrier.

In the past twenty years or so, there have been developments in vehicle control technology that can be incorporated into gate areas.  For example, there are pop up barriers that can be raised quickly if a bad guy is driving at the gate at a high rate of speed.  There are tire-rippers.  There are obstacles that can be put into place to make vehicles slow down as they approach.  I've seen buses, dump trucks, and cement barriers used in high threat situations.  I have big sand filled orange plastic highway barriers that are ready to be moved into place on short notice if I have to close off my main entry point or make a maze to slow down approaching traffic. But make sure that the legitimate traffic can get through.  I remember a situation in which permanent cement obstacles got installed and the first time one of the facility's big trucks came in , it could not make it through the obstacles.  They simply had not been designed for such a large vehicle.  It left a sensitive cargo "hanging out" until the obstacles could be removed.  Bad planning.

There are protective devices for barriers:

electrified wires (see above)

fluid pressure devices (when an intruder steps on the buried hose, the fluid in the hose causes a signal to be sent to security headquarters)

buried electrical cables that set up an electromagnetic field

infrared sensors

sound sensors

CCTV (closed circuit TV)

microwave sensors

"taut wire" sensors (a wire is woven though the fence fabric.  If it is pulled on or cut, a signal is sent to security headquarters)

Inside the perimeter, remember the clear zone.  Inside the perimeter parking should be prohibited or kept to a minimum.  Why?  Because vehicles are easy to use for sneaking in contraband and sneaking out stolen stuff.  This is an ideal situation and is often not feasible, especially since many large companies no longer have interior buses and taxis and rely on employees to use their own cars to get around the plant.  Also, some facilities in congested areas may not have places outside the facility for employees to park.  If vehicles are allowed inside the perimeter, control them and don't allow parking too close to the fence.  (Also, don't allow parking too close outside the fence.  Someone could use that vulnerability to throw stolen articles over the fence to their car or an accomplice's car.)  A lesson here: while the security ideals, such as no private vehicles inside the perimeter, sound pretty good as a security measure, remember the ideas of risk avoidance vs. risk management.  And remember that security needs to allow the business to operate.  This means the security manager has to sometimes find compromises.

Generally, you want to have lighting along the perimeter.  The rule of thumb is that the lighting should be inside the perimeter, shining out in the eyes of the intruder.  The security patrols should be well inside and behind the light so they can see out but the intruders can't see them.  Your text has lots of info about lighting on pages 157 to 164 - more info than you'll probably ever need!  Keep in mind that lighting and the other elements of the physical security system have to be put together to complement each other.  E.g., your lighting has to be compatible with your patrol system, your CCTV system, etc.  Also keep in mind that the lighting system (and other elements that work with electricity) need back-up power.  This is usually battery supplied for short periods and generator supplied for longer periods.  All of this requires the assistance of design engineers who understand security.

Assignment: answer the review question 2 on page 165.